INTRODUCTION
Geographical proximity drives many economic processes, despite globalization (Morgan 2004; McCann 2008) . Studies have demonstrated that geographical proximity stimulates inter-organizational interactions, such as scientific collaborations (e.g. Katz 2005), investments (e.g. Coval and Moskowitz 1999; Fritsch and Schilder 2008) or trade (e.g. Wolf 2000; Hillberry 2003) . The proximity literature (e.g. Rallet and Torre, 1999; Boschma, 2005; Knoben and Oerlemans 2006) claims that other kinds of proximity may also drive economic interactions. In this context, the role of cognitive proximity and industrial relatedness has gained special attention in recent years, especially in relation to regional growth and regional diversification (see e.g. Frenken et al. 2007; Neffke et al. 2011) .
There have been studies demonstrating that geographical proximity is an important driver of M&A's within countries (e.g. Böckerman and Lehto 2006; Grote and Umber know the exact headquarter location as well as all the company's business activities, indicated by NACE codes.
In Section 2, we elucidate on the underlying causes of the home bias and the industrial relatedness bias. In Section 3, we show how the data is collected and sampled, how the dependent variable (M&A partnering) and how the independent variables (geographical proximity, industrial relatedness and controls) are operationalized. We also elaborate on our methodology, which includes the construction of the home bias measure and the use of rare event logistic regression models. Section 4 presents some descriptives. In Section 5, we provide and discuss the results. In the final section, we conclude and discuss the theoretical implications of this research.
M&A PARTNERING AND THE ROLE OF GEOGRAPHICAL PROXIMITY AND INDUSTRIAL RELATEDNESS
Home bias -Acquirers that prefer geographically proximate targets are home biased.
For this, the literature provides four explanations: (a) information asymmetries, (b) familiarity, (c) strategy and (d) localization effects. Information asymmetries refer to unevenly distributed information, which limit (or enable) company's choices. Actors in geographical proximity have more and better information than non-local actors (Böckerman and Lehto 2006) , and therefore a different search context. In M&A partnering, information is crucial not only for the identification of potential partners but also for the success of the due diligence process (Chakrabarti and Mitchell 2008) . If the risk of adverse selection, i.e. the selection of a "bad" target, is mitigated and managers are aware of that, partnering may be more likely (Schildt and Laamanen 2006) .
When it comes to spatial behavior, managers also possess a cognitive bias towards their own local environment. This is what Huberman (2001) called familiarity. The neighborhood effect states that people tend to overvalue their own region (e.g. MacAllister et al. 2001) . While familiarity can be regarded as an irrational or unconscious factor, bidders may also choose a proximate target rationally. In these cases, target search and identification explicitly involve a spatial element (Laulajainen 1988) .
Strategic reasons to select a proximate target may be easing price competition (Levy and Reitzes 1992), the possibility to share common assets after the acquisition, and the capacity to monitor and lower implementation costs (Böckerman and Lehto 2006) .
The effect of localization refers to the spatial distribution of potential targets that satisfy the favored industrial profile. If certain industries are clustered, a bidder that selects a target within the same cluster and from the same industry is automatically home biased.
Although prospective buyers might strategically opt for distant targets in order to penetrate new geographical markets or to enter regions with lower production costs, we expect an overall home bias.
Based on this line of reasoning, we hypothesize that in domestic M&A deal announcements, bidders tend to select targets that are geographically closer than the average target. The existence of this bias can be tested by comparing the geographical distance between the bidder to the actual target and the average distance to a set of hypothetical targets. In our analysis, we also test at what spatial scales within a country, this home bias drives M&A deals.
Industrial relatedness bias -Next to geographical proximity, we argue that also industrial relatedness drives M&A partnering. The main reason to acquire a company from the same or a similar industry is the possibility to realize synergy effects. In fact, M&A research has extensively addressed the role of synergies that stems from related resources, such as similar products, technologies, distribution channels, and routines, among others (e.g. Chatterjee 1986; Sirower 1997; Seth et al. 2000; Homberg et al. 2009 ). If these resources are shared or efficiently combined, related, or horizontal, acquisitions can benefit from economies of scope and scale. The corporate diversification literature (Penrose 1959) and the resource-based view of the firm (Wernerfelt 1984 ) make similar suggestions. Additionally, companies are reluctant to establish radically new resource combinations due to path dependencies (Nelson and Winter 1982) . If companies can benefit from acquiring supplementary or complementary industries, partnering likelihood is expected to increase.
Additionally, information asymmetries may facilitate M&A partnering (Shen and Reuer 2005; Schildt and Laamanen 2006; Capron and Shen 2007) . If both firms are active within the same industry, their managers are more likely to know each other and to exchange information, which would affect the target identification phase (Chatterjee et al. 1992) . During the due diligence phase, bidders have an advantage when assessing industrially related targets because its value can be more easily determined. This should in turn increase the likelihood to acquire. Whereas Mitchell and Shaver (2003) found that only bidders with a large product line scope tend to purchase overlapping product lines, it appears that technological relatedness has a significant impact on partnering (e.g. Ahuja and Katila 2001; Schildt and Laamanen 2006; Hussinger 2010) .
Therefore, we expect that in domestic M&A deal announcements, bidders will select targets that are industrially more related than the average target. This effect can be tested by comparing industrial relatedness between the bidder and its actual target and between the bidder and the average industrial relatedness to a set of hypothetical targets. Previous studies based the allocation of potential targets to bidders on different temporal scopes. While Hussinger (2010) selected random targets from the same year as the acquisition, Chakrabarti and Mitchell (2008) took targets during a five-year window around the deal announcement date. As our models did not occur to be time-sensitive, we follow Grote and Umber (2006) , who used a time window of 18 months before and after the date of deal announcement. The use of this time window seems to be realistic due to the tediousness of M&A decisions and the fact that this resulted in a sufficient amount of observations (and hence allowed for accurate subsampling). In conjunction with the required time lapse, we selected the targets of all deals that were announced Industrial relatedness -The standard method of measuring industrial relatedness is to indicate whether two activity codes belong to the same level within the hierarchy of an industrial classification system (Frenken et al. 2007 ). Other more sophisticated measures of industry relatedness exist, like product-relatedness (see e.g. Neffke et al.
2011
), but we have no product data for the Netherlands to measure the degree of product-relatedness across industries. We use the primary NACE code, which indicates the section, division, group and class of the company's core business. There are 21
sections (e.g. "Information and Communication"), 88 divisions (e.g. "Publishing activities"), 272 groups (e.g. "Publishing of books, periodicals and other publishing activities") and 615 classes (e.g. "Publishing of newspapers"). As for many companies information on the class is not available, we consider groups as the most detailed level. as it did not seem to play a role in M&A partnering (see Table 5 ).
Data sampling - Table 1 match of these cases with data from the REACH database showed that in most of these cases, the bidder shared exactly the same address as the target. We suspect that postcodes in these cases do not reflect the location before the deal but the location after the deal. Consequently, all cases with identical addresses and all cases for which no address information was available were excluded. Finally, we excluded 70 deals for which the NACE group of the bidder or target was unknown. This sampling procedure led to a total sample of 1,855 real partnerings.
<Table 1>
Control for localization effect -We argued earlier there are four explanations for home bias, of which localization effect is one. We control for this effect by an assumption regarding the uneven distribution of different industries in space. Instead of assuming that partnering can occur between all kinds of companies, we assume that bidders can only select companies of the same industry as the company that was finally targeted.
Grote and Umber (2006) made a similar assumption. This implies that bidders decide on the industry of the target firm before the target identification process starts, or vice versa, that targets can only match with bidders of the same industry as the actual buyer.
Technically speaking, we used a sub-sample of industry-matched non-partnerings. 
Construction of individual home bias measures
However, this measure does not take into account the different ranges of possible distances for every bidder. Therefore, it is corrected by the minimum and maximum possible distance to every potential target:
As the number of potential targets can be very small and may bias the results, we define a threshold of a minimum number of potential targets and test whether the number of potential targets has an influence on the home bias. We decided that the home bias can only be estimated for bidders that have at least five potential targets (or at least three potential targets for the industry-matched deals), excluding the real target. A higher threshold would lead to a loss of many deals and therefore unrepresentative results. A correlation analysis showed some significant, but very weak, relationships between the number of potential targets and ABS_HB b and REL_HB b , respectively (maximum absolute value of Kendall's tau = -0.098, p<0.01). This means the home bias is slightly biased by the number of potential targets.
M&A partnering as rare events -We applied a logistic regression model, but with
some adaptation, because of the discrepancy between the low number of partnerings and the inflated number of non-partnerings. Otherwise, the likelihood of rare events would be underestimated and wrong standard errors given (King and Zeng 2001a). Another problem is that an estimation of the full model with 1.6 million non-events and only 1,855 events gave a very bad goodness of overall fit and strong overdispersion.
In order to cope with this, we created a subsample by means of endogenous stratification, which is used in econometrics (Manski and Lerman 1977) and epidemiology (Breslow and Day 1980) . Endogenous stratification simply splits observations into a set of events and a set of non-events. We then randomly, i.e.
independently from all other variables, select from the 0's and select all available 1's. In that way, we do not lose consistency or efficiency compared to the full sample ( 
DESCRIPTION OF DEALS, BIDDERS AND TARGETS
On a global scale, M&A deals are spatially concentrated. Table 2 shows that 69% of all domestic deals took place within ten countries only, and 88% of all bidders were located in one of these ten countries during the first decade of the twenty-first century.
Measured by the number of announced deals, the Netherlands was the ninth largest M&A market in the world. And whereas the average proportion of domestic deals was about 75% worldwide, it was 67% in the Netherlands. This reflects the international orientation of Dutch corporations. Table 4 gives descriptives of the bidder and target characteristics. It stands out that bidders are more often financial companies than targets, which is in line with the argument that many deals may be pure financial deals. Another distinguishing feature is that 9.3% of all bidders are listed while this is true for only 0.3% of the targets.
Furthermore, targets have less subsidiaries and are less diversified than bidders.
<Table 4>
Descriptives of the relational variables are given in Table 5 , depicting differences between the partnerings and the peer group of non-partnerings. M&A deals occur at shorter average geographical distance, as compared to non-partnering. Still, the majority of M&A takes place between provinces. M&A deals also occur on average between more closely related industries than non-partnering. This difference is especially striking at the most detailed intra-group level.
<Table 5>
RESULTS
Domestic and regional home bias - Table 6 shows that Dutch bidders are home biased when it comes to domestic M&As: the average absolute home bias of 25.5 km is significantly positive. A significant home bias also exists in regional M&A deals, i.e.
partnerings in which bidder and target are located within the same province, COROP region or municipality. Here, the average home biases are 10.2 km, 5.2 km and 1.0 km, respectively. Striking is that even the home bias on a municipality level is significantly positive. This value turns insignificant though when we test industry-matched partnerings. That means that the localization effect is the main reason why, on a municipality level, companies are more likely to partner in geographical proximity.
The standardization of the values by the minimum and maximum distance to all potential targets enables a comparison of the role of geographical proximity on different spatial scales. As non-overlapping 95%-confidence intervals of the relative values reveal, the regional home biases on the level of COROP regions and provinces were significantly higher than the average domestic home bias. Next to the home bias in kilometers and as a relative value, we show how many bidders are actually home biased.
On the national scale, these are more than two-thirds of all bidders.
<Table 6>
Logistic regressions -We estimated some logistic regression models which included the geographical proximity, industrial relatedness and control variables. As explained earlier, our dependent variable is whether two companies were partnering (1) or nonpartnering (0). The correlation matrix can be found in the Appendix (Table A1) . Instead of DISTANCE, we estimated the effect of its logarithmic term LnDISTANCE, which led to a slightly better overall fit of the model.
As shown in Table 7 , we found a logarithmic relationship between distance and partnering likelihood. The effect of LnDISTANCE is about the same in the full model (Model D) and the model without industrial relatedness predictors (Model C). All three categorical geographical proximity variables turned out to be positive and significant and the likelihood of M&A partnering was highest within the same municipality. As shown in the appendix (Table A2) , companies within the same municipality have a 4%
to 168% higher chance to partner. Interesting is also that LnDISTANCE remained significant when estimated jointly with the three spatial dummies. This means that pure distance in km and co-location at various spatial scales do have a distinct effect on M&A partnering.
<Table 7>
We also found a clear, strong relationship between industrial relatedness and M&A partnering. All industrial relatedness dummies were positive and significant. As shown in Table A2 the likelihood of partnering was about 71 to 104 times higher within the same group (i.e. at the most detailed industrial level). Interaction effects between geographical proximity and industrial relatedness did not appear to be significant.
With respect to the control variables, we found that partnering is significantly more likely if both companies have multiple sites and activities. Furthermore, the models illustrate that partnering is a rare event. If partnering occurs randomly, its probability would be 1,855/1,608,863 = 0.115%. The full model raised the average partnering probability to 0.549%, which is nearly five times larger than a random guess. Overall, likelihood-ratio tests showed that the full model should be preferred over the model without geographical proximity variables (D=6,540-6,078=462), over the model without industrial relatedness variables (D=9,331-6,078=3,253) and over the model with the control variables only (D=10,125-6,078=4,047).
In order to test the model's quality and generalizability, we exerted various tests. Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) suggest to cross-validate the model by splitting the data randomly into a selection of 80% and run the model on this training sample and its counterpart with the remaining 20% of the data. We could not find significant differences in the values of the R 2 s and bs and attest the model generalizing well.
Furthermore, we searched for cases that might have exerted an undue influence on the model, i.e. outliers that bias the model, and outliers for which the model fits poorly. A commonly used statistic to estimate the overall influence of a single case on the model is Cook's distance. Cook and Weisberg (1982) suggest that this statistic should not exceed 1. Indeed, there were no influential cases or outsiders, as the largest value was 0.10. In order to examine the fit between data and model, we examined the values of standardized and studentized residuals. Field (2009) suggests watching out for residuals with an absolute value larger than 1.96, 2.58 and 3.29, whose fractions should not exceed 5%, 1% and 0%, respectively. These limits were kept for standardized residuals and deviance, but not for studentized residuals, suggesting that for some cases the model might fit poorly.
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
This paper shows that geographical proximity is an important driver of regional M&A partnering. We could show a significant effect of geographical proximity on Dutch domestic deals by individual home bias measures and by means of logistic regression, which allowed controlling for other effects. We found strong evidence that Dutch bidders tend to select targets that are geographically closer than the average target. This is in line with findings in studies on Finnish deals (Böckermann and Letho 2006) and US deals (Eun and Mukherjee, 2006; Grote and Umber, 2006; Chakrabarti and Mitchell, 2008) . In their study on German M&As, Rodríguez-Pose and Zademach (2003; could find associations between geographical proximity and M&A activity only in combination with agglomerations. We did not find such evidence in the Netherlands, as companies in non-urban provinces such as Zeeland or Friesland were even more home biased than companies in urban provinces like Utrecht, for instance.
Our analyses showed that geographical proximity even drives deals at various, quite detailed sub-national scales and thus suggest the existence of a regional home bias. The effect on deals within the same municipality could be explained by localization effects.
This means that, given that bidders are restricted to a specific target industry, there is not much other choice than selecting a target that is closer than the average target because many industries are clustered. The results suggested that companies located in the same region have a higher chance to merge. Striking is that pure geographical distance has an additional effect. For example, within the same municipality, two companies that are 4 kilometers apart from each other are more likely to merge than two companies that are 7 kilometers apart from each other.
Furthermore, we found strong evidence that companies that share the same or similar industry are more likely to engage in an M&A deal. The effect of industrial relatedness is stronger than the effect of geographical proximity. By modeling the effects of industrial relatedness and geographical proximity jointly, we could show that the two effects are not reinforcing each other, but that they are independent. In that respect, our paper contributes to the proximity literature (Boschma 2005) .
Of course, our study opens up a lot of research challenges. In the theoretical part, we described several factors that might account for the effect of geographical proximity and industrial relatedness. It would, therefore, be interesting to examine the contribution of each of these different factors. Furthermore, our home bias measure calls for more research that examines its determinants. These can be company-or industry-specific, but also temporal or place-specific. For example, for small companies, familiarity and information asymmetries may be more decisive than for large companies. Note: Industry-matched non-partnerings are based on the assumption that the bidder could only select between targets that are active in the same industry as the bidder's real target. Note: For the subsample of non-financial deals (excluding all deals with bidders in NACE section K "Financial and insurance activities"), the effect of geographical proximity was slightly weaker while the effect of industrial relatedness was considerably stronger. ܴ ே ଶ increased from 0.513 to 0.546.
The significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.1. 
